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In this department every effort is made to publish timely announcements of future meet- 
ings, as well as reports of events and papers presented at past meetings. For this we rely on 
the organizers of meetings to send us announcements as early as possible. and on colleagues 
in each country to send us reports of local activities in the history of mathematics. Unneces- 
sary duplication may be avoided by checking with the Editor or the nearest member of the 
International Commission listed on the back cover of Historia Murhemaricu before submit- 
ting reports to this department. 
Conference on History and Philosophy of Modern Mathematics 
The Alfred P. Sloan Foundation and the University of Minnesota are sponsor- 
ing a conference on the History and Philosophy of Modern Mathematics, to be 
held in Minneapolis, 17-19 May 1985. Session topics include: 
Historical and Philosophical Perspectives on Modern Logic 
The Relations between History and Philosophy of Mathematics 
Case Studies in the History and Philosophy of Mathematics 
Conceptual Development of Nineteenth-Century Mathematics 
Mathematical Perspectives on the History and Philosophy of Mathematics 
For further information please contact: 
Dr. William Aspray 
Charles Babbage Institute 
104 Walter Library 
117 Pleasant Street SE 
University of Minnesota 
Minneapolis, MN 55455 
OR Professor Philip Kitcher 
Minnesota Center for the 
Philosophy of Science 
Ford Hall 
University of Minnesota 
Minneapolis, MN 554.55 
Bertrand Russell Conference 
By Albert C. Lrwis 
Bertrand Russell Editorial Project. McMaster University, Hamilton. Ontario L8S 4M2. Canada 
The Second Russell Conference, 1984, “On Russell’s Early Technical Philoso- 
phy,” was held June 21-24 at Trinity College, University of Toronto. The 
Bertrand Russell Society and the Advisory Editorial Board of The Collected 
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Papers of Bertrand Russell met in conjunction with the Conference. It was sup- 
parted by The Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, The 
Russell Editorial Project at McMaster University, The Institute for History and 
Philosophy of Science and Technology of the University of Toronto, and The 
Or tario Institute for Studies in Education (OISE). An audio recording was made 
of the discussions and it is expected that the proceedings will be published. The 
Ccnference was organized by Dr. Ian Winchester, OISE, 252 Bloor St. West, 
Toronto MSS lV6, Canada. 
‘The sessions were: 
I. From the Foundations of Geometry to Leibniz 
John Slater (Toronto)-Russell’s conception of philosophy 
Joan Richards (Brown)-Russell’s Foundations of Geometry and the 
Cambridge mathematical tradition 
Nicholas Griffin (McMaster)-The Tiergarten Programme 
Ian Winchester (Ontario Institute for Studies in Education)-The pic- 
ture of physical science in “Leibniz” and “the Principles” 
Gregory H. Moore (Stanford)-The roots of Russell’s discovery of the 
paradoxes in logic and set theory 
II. Early work on the Theory of Knowledge and The Philosophy of Mind 
Michael Bradie (Bowling Green)-Russell’s scientific realism 
Robert Tully (Toronto)-Neutral monism 
Janet Farrell Smith (Massachusetts)-Russell’s re-evaluation of 
Meinong 
111. Philosophy of logic and language from The Principles to Principia 
Daniel O’Leary (Maine)-The propositional logic of Principiu Muthe- 
muticu and some of its forerunners 
Alasdair Urquhart (Toronto)-Russell’s zigzag path to the ramified 
theory of types 
I. Grattan-Guinness (Middlesex Polytechnic)-Russell’s logical manu- 
scripts: An apprehensive brief 
Martha Harrell (St. John’s University, New York)-Extension to ge- 
ometry of Principia Muthemutica and related systems 
IV. Logical questions in the Principiu 
Michel Seymour (Universite de Quebec)-The referential uses of defi- 
nite descriptions 
Jocelyne Couture (Universite de Montreal)-On the efficacy of substi- 
tutional quantifiers for the elimination of classes in Principiu Muthe- 
maticu 
IXscussion on the tenability of Russell’s early technical philosophy, led by the 
panel: A. J. Ayer, I. Grattan-Guinness, Nicholas Griffin, and Robert 
Tull y . 
The conference theme was set by John Slater’s presentation of Russell’s demar- 
cation between logic and science-which he once described as “what we know,” 
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on the one hand-and philosophy-“what we don’t know,” on the other: and of 
Russell’s conception of Principia as a “scientific” work whose precision (cold but 
far from passionless according to letters to Ottoline Morrell) was to be contrasted 
with the “usual,” loose, pre-Russellian philosophy. (A. J. Ayer remarked that 
Russell’s emphasis on passion may only have been an attempt to demonstrate to 
Ottoline Morrell that he was not a “dry-as-dust” philosopher.) 
A number of presentations were related directly to the history of mathematics: 
Joan Richard’s analysis of An ESSLI~ 011 the Forrndtrtiorls c#Gcomt,try and her 
description of it as a work which straightened out substantial parts of the quite 
muddled area of foundations of geometry were well received by other 
participants. Her thesis, however. that Fourdrrtioru was part of a “peculiarly 
British and Cambridge-centered mathematical tradition” was questioned. since 
Russell’s relatively few references to Arthur Cayley and Sir Robert Ball seemed 
to be the only supporting evidence. 
Nicholas Griffin, an Editor of the Colktrtl Pnprrs, coined the term T’icr,qtrrtc,n 
Progrummr to refer to the projects for future work Russell thought out in 1895 
during a walk in the Berlin Tiergarten park. In his Autohio,yrctpky Russell 
describes them as falling into two series: one on the philosophy of sciences and the 
other on social questions. Griffin described the science series in terms not only of 
Fo~rnd~rtions of’ Geometry and 77~ Prirlciplrs c!f’ Mrrthrrncrtic,s-which can be 
viewed as its first and last parts, respectively-but also in terms of unpublished 
outlines. tables of contents. and other papers in the Russell Archives from the 
period 1895 to 1903. 
Russell’s break with neo-Hegelianism. in spite of his own description of it as 
both instantaneous and complete, still left him with an interest in antinomies or 
paradoxes as keys to analyzing a subject. This continuing interest, Gregory 
Moore posited in his talk, lay behind Russell’s discovery of his famous paradox. 
The further contention. however. that Russell’s neo-Hegelian background 
disposed him to report the paradox to G. Frege in 1902 as if it were no more 
significant than other paradoxes of Russell’s, was questioned by Nicholas Griffin 
who believed Russell must have been aware of its potentially devastating effect but 
deliberately underplayed his presentation of it. 
Daniel O’Leary, using computers to analyze the proofs of PrimYpitr, has 
revealed some gaps and inconsistencies. This technique has also helped to make 
explicit Russell’s proof methods and allowed a closer comparison with earlier 
works from Peano’s “Formule di logica matematica” (1891) through Russell’s 
“The Theory of Implication” ( 1906). 
When the importance of Russell’s set-theory paradox, about which he wrote to 
Frege in 1902, became clear, Russell sought a solution of it. Alasdair Urquhart 
identified three main theories Russell worked on before settling on the ramified 
theory of types: the type theory of the Primipks. the zig-zag theory of 1904, and 
the substitutional theory of 1905. Urquhart was struck by Russell’s reluctance to 
adopt any form of type theory and attributed it to the Frege-Russell view of logic 
as a universal science applicable to all conceivable entities. Quantifiers thus 
would have unlimited range as opposed to the modern practice, apparently first 
used by A. De Morgan, of always establishing at the beginning a limited “universe 
of discourse.” 
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Urquhart referred to one of Russell’s “logical diary” manuscripts in the Russell 
Archives. A page from such a manuscript, displayed by an overhead projector, 
was a part of I. Grattan-Guinness’s talk on the logical manuscripts. While some 
manuscripts are clearly in a publishable form and others clearly of a working, 
“diary,” nature, many are less easy to describe and, therefore. present 
classification problems for the Collected Papers edition. Grattan-Guinness 
surveyed the mathematical-logical material, indicated what we may be able to 
learn from them, and presented his personal evaluation of a number of possible 
ways of meeting the typographical challenge the publication of their special 
symbolism presents. His solution, admitting it to be not ideal, was to typeset only 
the editorial apparatus in the most challenging cases and include microfiche 
copies of the texts with the volumes. 
There is no extant manuscript, apart from a couple of pages, of the Principk, 
let alone of its projected fourth volume which was to be on geometry. Martha 
Harrell was evidently used to the initial skepticism shown by scholars when she 
described a “Volume Four,” but she went on to present clues from a variety of 
sources-Whitehead’s reports to Russell on progress in the Geometry, forward 
references in Principiu, and other publications by Russell and 
Whitehead-which, pieced together, provide a basis for comparing Principicr’s 
version of the foundations of geometry to other approaches. 
The panel discussion, led by A. J. Ayer, picked up points made in the papers 
and in earlier discussions, with members of the audience joining in. Some remarks 
bave been reported above along with the papers concerned. In addition, one of the 
extended discussions returned to Principiu and paradoxes. Grattan-Guinness sug- 
gested that one of Principia’s problems was Russell’s uncertainty about the status 
of the assumption that there are infinitely many individuals; Russell thought that 
t,!le need for an infinity axiom was an empirical matter. Quine said that this sort of 
problem has led him to prefer an approach like von Neumann’s where the natural 
numbers are constructed from sets: 0 is defined to be the null set, 1 the set 
containing the null set, and so forth. This approach avoids positing the existence 
cf infinitely many individuals. Russell really wanted to reduce mathematics to 
li)gic, Ayer and Grattan-Guinness agreed, since logical entities were less mysteri- 
GUS for him than numbers. To Quine’s question-whether Russell would have 
l/ked von Neumann’s numbers-Ayer replied no, adding that Russell stuck to 
analyticity, which he considered very important for mathematics, to the extent of 
disliking Kant’s synthetic a priori description of mathematics; in general, Russell 
Ulought Kant a disaster for philosophy. 
Grattan-Guinness emphasized the fact that Russell made no use of a theory- 
meta-theory distinction which would have helped him, for example, avoid some of 
tBle flaws O’Leary pointed out in Principia. This fundamental limitation of logi- 
cism, as Grattan-Guinness saw it, was related to the fact that Principiu has little to 
do with mathematics as mathematicians would have conceived it at the time. 
Quine pointed out that the logicist thesis has come to be asserted as “classical 
areas of mathematics (such as number theory and analysis) can be embedded in 
set theory” rather than as “mathematics is logic.” As a historical matter, the 
circularity of the latter thesis could only be broken, Grattan-Guinness asserted, if 
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Russell had had a definition of logic independent of logicism. Yvon Gauthier 
agreed with Grattan-Guinness and pointed out that for some modern French 
mathematicians, notably Dieudonne and Thorn. set theory is “not serious 
enough” even to be a part of mathematics. 
Third International Conference on the 
History of Chinese Science 
BEIJING, CHINA. Amus-r 20-2.5. 1984 
The Conference was convened under the auspices of Academia Sinica, Beijing, 
and hosted by the Institute for the History of Natural Science. The following 
papers were presented in the section on history of mathematics and physics: 
1. Shen Kang-shen: Further Cognitions about Certain Prominent Inven- 
tions on Algebraic Fields in Ancient China 
2. Chen Cheng-Yih: The Development of Numeration Principles in Current 
Positional Numerals 
3. K. Chemla: Towards the Comparison of Algorithms 
4. Lam Lay Yong: Yang Hui’s Link with the Mathematics of the Past 
5. Li Ji-min: The Origin of Diao Ri Method 
6. Shimodaira Kazuo: Reckoning (or computing) Rods and Suan-Pan in 
Japan 
7. Oh-take Shige-o: How European Mathematics Was Accepted in Japan 
through Chinese Translations 
8. J. C. Martzloff: The Manchu Manuscript “Bodoro arga i oyonggongge be 
araha uheri hesen i bithe” of the Bibliotheque Nationale: Preliminary 
Investigations 
9. Ozawa Yasumi: A Study on the Accuracy of the number 7~ 
10. Qian Ke-ren: On the Basic Methods of Determining DINGSHU (Fixed 
Number) in Qin Jiushao’s DAYAN QIUYISHU (Method of Seeking 
Unity) 
11. C. Jami: Ming Antu’s Ge Yuan Mi Lu Jie Fa: Chinese Tradition and 
Western Influence 
12. Luo Jian-jin: On Counting Functions of Mathematicians Xu, Li, Xia, and 
Hua 
13. Liu Dun: On the Synthetic Study of Conies of Xia Luanxiang 
14. Wang Yu-sheng: Some Concepts and Methods of Differential and Inte- 
gral Calculus in Traditional Chinese Mathematics 
15. Chen Cheng-Yih: Early Chinese Work on Harmonic Progression in Tonal 
System 
16. Wang Jin-guang: Knowledge of Optics in Zhen Fuguang’s Feiyin Yuzhi 
LU 
17. U. Libbrecht: Introduction of the Thermometer in China 
